Incentivizing Exploration and Stopping (Job Market Paper)
Description: We study a dynamic principal-agent problem where a principal seeks to acquire information about a project with uncertain returns and contracts with an agent to conduct the experiments. While the principal (she) commits to flexibly designing the experiments and rewards, the agent (he) can stop at any time and is constrained by his technology, which limits how much information he can generate. We show that there exists a simple and optimal contract: the principal acquires information via breakthroughs, offers a deterministic and nondecreasing transfer schedule over time, and recommends stopping after any breakthrough realization. This result is driven by the players' exponential discounting and differing risk-attitudes over money. Moreover, it provides a theoretical foundation for restricting attention to a simple class of contracts.
More Dependence and Correlation
(Coming Soon) With Hector Chade
Description: We motivate and explore the positive likelihood ratio dependence (PLRD) order in the context of the multivariate Gaussian distribution. Within this family, PLRD provides a stronger sense of more dependence compared to the supermodular stochastic order. As an economic application, we study a stylized principal multi-agent problem with moral hazard where each agent exerts effort to produce their own output, and the agents' outputs are correlated. Under regularity assumptions, an increase in the PLRD order among the agents' outputs implies a decrease in the principal's expected cost. The intuition is that the PLRD order not only provides a more dependent notion, but also more informativeness. We also illustrate an application where the principal benefits from sorting high-ability agents together, and show that the order can be used in large matching markets to predict equilibria exhibiting positive assortative matching.
How Clinicians' Decisions Affect Recipient Life-Years from Transplantation (LYFT)
(Coming Soon) With Tomas Larroucau, Ellen Green, E Glenn Dutcher, Jesse D Schold, and Darren Stewart
Description: Within the allocation of deceased donor kidneys, clinicians play a key role in making acceptance decisions on behalf of recipients in the waitlist. However, as the literature documents, it is unclear why there is substantial clinician-level variation in decisions, what channels drive it, and how it impacts recipients' survival outcomes. Using administrative data, this paper studies these questions to evaluate the effect of clinicians' decisions on recipient life-years from transplantation (LYFT). We exploit the exogenous variation of on-call data to identify clinician-specific unobservables which induce selection on both their acceptance decisions and each recipient's survival outcomes. We build a structural model of clinician's acceptance decisions which reflect arbitrary correlation structure between recipient, donor, clinician, and match-specific unobservables. Our goal is to estimate the model and conduct counterfactual exercises to assess how several types of clinicians affect assignment outcomes.